According to Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead (2006) , instrumental goals refer to the maximization of profit whereas identity goals are associated with the attainment of a positive social identity. In two experiments, we show that when negotiations are purely instrumental individuals prefer pro-outgroup deviants as representatives (Experiments 1 and 2). In contrast, when negotiations are identity-related, group members increase their preference for normative (Experiments 1 and 2) and pro-ingroup deviants (Experiment 1). Furthermore, these goals also impact perceptions of typicality of group members. Taken together, these results suggest strategic acceptance of deviance when the goal is to bring the other party to concede and increased preference for normativity when identity is the group's main preoccupation. We discuss implications of these results for research on negotiation as well as on the influence of the intergroup context on intragroup dynamics.
Intergroup negotiations often entail consequences for large numbers of people. It is seldom the case, however, that all group members are or even can be simultaneously present at the bargaining table. This is why intergroup negotiations frequently take place by means of representatives. Ample research has demonstrated that representatives constitute a special case of negotiators due to their boundary position between their constituency's expectations and the opposing party demands (Adams, 1976; Enzle, Harvey, & Wright, 1992; Wall, 1975) . In spite of the key role of group representatives in negotiations, surprisingly little is known on the process that guides their selection. This is unfortunate because the selection of a representative will likely orient negotiation processes. As Lewicki, Saunders, and Barry (2006, p. 3, italics in original) put it, "many of the important factors that shape a negotiation result do not occur during the negotiation; they occur before the parties start to negotiate, or shape the context around the negotiation". Our research agenda is to shed light on this issue and, specifically, to examine the extent to which the selection of a representative depends on the goals pursued by the group. The question we ask is: do group members select different means to different ends?
Goals in negotiation settings
Lay beliefs on negotiations often include win-lose, fixed-pie, representations of the situation: performance is measured in terms of material outcomes that one manages to take from (or not give to) the other party (Thompson, 2006) . Sometimes, however, negotiations become more a matter of identity than of material profit. Identity goals come into play to the extent that a social identity is made salient (van Vugt & De Cremer, 2002) , that material resources acquire some symbolic identity-related value (Ledgerwood, Liviatan, & Carnevale, 2007) , or that social identity is under threat (Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2003) . Although research on the influence of identity goals in intergroup negotiations is scarcer than work examining instrumental motivations, identity concerns may sometimes frame negotiations in very substantial ways. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998) or the Kosovo one (Coleman, 2000) constitute powerful illustrations of situations in which identity plays a key role. Such longlasting conflicts involve "malignant social processes" leading to situations in which people do not see an exit "without becoming vulnerable to an unacceptable loss in a value central for their self-identities or selfesteem" (Deutsch, 1985, p. 263) .
The distinction between instrumental and identity motivations transpires in many domains of social psychology. For instance, Manstead (2002, 2006) ; Scheepers et al. (2003) provided an integrative framework explaining the motivational basis for ingroup bias. They argued that ingroup bias can be approached from two different perspectives stemming from instrumental and identity theories of intergroup relations. Instrumental theories define intergroup interdependence as a critical condition for the emergence of ingroup bias. For example, the Realistic Conflict Theory (Sherif & Sherif, 1969) holds that intergroup differentiation is the outcome of intergroup competition for scarce resources. Ingroup instrumental goals are related to material profit and ingroup members are motivated to maximize tangible gains. In contrast, identity approaches like Social Identity Theory (SIT, Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and Self-Categorization Theory (SCT, Turner, 1987) posit that identity processes are the primary cause for ingroup bias. Identity goals are defined in symbolic terms and ingroup members' chief motivation is to acquire a positive and distinctive social identity by means of a comparison process with an outgroup.
Similarly, van Vugt and De Cremer (2002) make a distinction between instrumental and relational motives and argue that these distinct motives underlie the endorsement of different types of leader. Instrumental needs come into play when individuals' primary concern within the group is short-term self-interest. Relational needs are in order when the aim is to secure a positive social identity for group members (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) . The literature thus suggests that two main types of goals guide group members' behavior. Instrumental motives refer to the maximization of group profit whereas identity motivations relate to the need for a distinctive positive social identity. Assuming that different group goals may influence the selection of ingroup representatives, the next section examines how potential representatives can be distinguished according to their position within the group.
Different types of ingroup representatives
Not all group members are equal within a group. Some are perceived as highly typical and normative group members whereas others occupy a more peripheral position or could even be considered deviant group members. Generally, people like normative ingroup members and dislike deviant ones (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988) . As a matter of fact, typical group members are usually supported as leaders because of 1) their ability to ensure intergroup differentiation; 2) the fact that they are more informative about the nature of the group; and 3) their power within the group that stems from their social attractiveness (Hogg, 2001) . Furthermore, leaders who are typical ingroup members are seen as more charismatic than atypical ones (Platow, van Knippenberg, Haslam, van Knippenberg, & Spears, 2006) . In contrast, deviant ingroup members are usually derogated because of the threat that they pose to the group's public image (the "black-sheep effect", Marques & Paez, 1994; Marques et al., 1988) .
Preference for prototypicality, however, would not seem to be inevitable. In some cases, deviance is tolerated and even propped up. In a recent study conducted among partisans of the British Conservative Party (BCP), Morton, Postmes, and Jetten (2007) manipulated the normative position of BCP's candidates as well as the extent to which the public opinion was thought to be supportive of or hostile to the BCP. When the public opinion was allegedly hostile to the BCP, high identifiers supported a deviant candidate who was closer to the public opinion than a normative candidate. The reverse pattern emerged when the public opinion was presented as supporting the BCP. Mediation analyses revealed that support for a candidate was predicted by the perceived public favourability towards the candidate, suggesting a strategic acceptance of deviance when deviance was linked to higher probabilities of group success.
A similar message emerges from the literature on political economics. Hamlin and Jennings (2007) argued that the choice of a leader depends on the strength of "instrumental" and "expressive" interests. Instrumental interests are associated with the preference for moderate representatives "that will leave them best off in terms of the final social outcome" (p. 50). In contrast, expressive interests increase support for those who best impersonate the group's identity, regardless of rational, instrumental concerns. In these cases, people are likely to endorse more "radical" leaders than moderate ones. Finally, in organizational psychology, van Vugt and De Cremer (2002) showed that preference for a legitimate leader type is especially strong when social identity rather than self-interest is made salient.
In sum, the above research suggests that instrumental versus identity motivations influence group members' selection of leaders such that instrumental goals favour more moderate leaders, whereas identity motivations encourage group members to support legitimate, normative, or more radical leaders.
Representative selection for intergroup negotiations as function of group goals
The research presented above on leadership endorsement seems to suggest that people generally prefer typical or normative leaders. However, two nuances should be made when importing these results into negotiation contexts. First, this research refers to general (i.e., selecting a long-time leader) rather than specific representation (i.e. selecting a representative to accomplish a given task). In all likelihood, the selection of long-term leaders versus negotiation agents does not entirely overlap. As a matter of fact, groups do not necessarily send their leaders to the negotiation table. Second, this research examines endorsement of normative and deviant targets as representatives in the absence of a clear intergroup interaction. Taking into account both intergroup contact as a mandatory feature of intergroup negotiations and the meta-contrast principle (Turner, 1987) , the typicality of group members in intergroup negotiations should be assessed not only by considering their position within the ingroup but also their relative proximity with the outgroup. A prototypical member should then be able to minimize intragroup differences and to maximize intergroup ones (Haslam, Oakes, McGarty, & Turner, 1995) . This allows distinguishing between two types of deviants: pro-ingroup and prooutgroup deviants. In line with the definition proposed by Abrams, Marques, Bown, and Henson (2000) , pro-ingroup deviants are targets that are perceived as deviating from the norm or the prototype of the ingroup in a direction opposite to the outgroup whereas pro-outgroup deviants deviate in the outgroup's direction. The further away a target is from the outgroup (i.e., pro-ingroup deviant), the more radical it is from the outgroup's point of view. Conversely, the closest the target is to the outgroup (i.e., pro-outgroup deviant), the more moderate it will be perceived by outgroup members.
Given that people's primary motivation in instrumental negotiations is to maximize tangible gains, group members need to select a representative who takes forward the ingroup's position and encourages the outgroup to make concessions. A strategic perception of the intergroup situation should then encourage group members to select a group representative with a high influence potential on the outgroup. To the extent that group members realize that people usually prefer (Byrne, 1997) and are more likely to be convinced by a person who resembles them (Burger, Messian, Patel, del Prado, & Anderson, 2004; Kelley & Woodruff, 1956; Silvia, 2005) , they should select a representative who is close to rather than distant from the outgroup. Consistent with Morton et al.'s (2007) idea that deviance will be supported when it serves ingroup goals, we hypothesized that, when instrumental goals are at stake, individuals should opt for a representative who is perceived to be close to rather than distant from the outgroup. In contrast, when identity goals are salient, we predicted that people should seek for positive distinctiveness from outgroup members (Scheepers et al., 2002) . As a consequence, relative to a negotiation in which instrumental goals are at work, we should observe a stronger preference for representatives who are normative, prototypical, or simply more distant from the outgroup.
Overview of the studies
We tested our hypotheses in two experiments. In a first experiment, the priority was placed on testing our hypothesis independently of any other contextual factors. To prevent the interference of variables such as ingroup identification or level of interdependence between the groups, we opted for a totally abstract scenario. The scenario described a situation in which a group had to select a representative for an intergroup negotiation, the topic of which remained unknown to the participants. No information was provided about the groups and participants were not led to believe that they belonged to any of them. Negotiation goals were manipulated using a priming procedure. Acknowledging that the methodological strength (i.e., abstractness of the scenario) of this first experiment can also be considered as its weakness (especially in what concerns identity goals), we conducted a second experiment in a much more meaningful context. In Experiment 2, we used relevant social categories and the negotiation scenario involved a real event that takes place once a year at the participants' university.
Experiment 1

Method Participants and design
Fifty-nine students (33 women, 1 unknown), aged 18 to 30 (M = 21.11, SD= 2.34), volunteered to participate in exchange of course credit. The design consisted in a 3 (negotiation goal: instrumental vs. identity vs. control) × 3 (potential representative: pro-ingroup vs. normative vs. pro-outgroup) mixed design with the latter factor varying within participants.
Procedure
Participants were presented with an upcoming negotiation between two fictitious groups (group A and group B) to which they did not belong. They learned that their task would be to assess the suitability of three targets as negotiators for group A. The targets varied in their level of support for group A's position (100% vs. 80% vs. 60%, corresponding to the pro-ingroup deviant, normative, and pro-outgroup deviant targets, respectively). To prevent participants from interpreting lower degrees of support as impartiality or absence of opinion it was further mentioned that, for instance, someone who agreed 80% with group A's position necessarily agreed 20% with group B. No other information was provided.
Next, participants were invited to answer a series of questions designed to prime either instrumental or identity motivations (see Appendix). Participants in the instrumental goal condition answered questions regarding the effective influence of the potential representatives. In the identity goal condition, participants received questions about the capability of targets to defend group A's values and image. Participants in the control condition answered no questions.
Finally, participants rated the suitability of each one of the three targets as group representatives on a scale from 1 (= not at all) to 7 (= totally) by answering the following question "to what extent would you chose this person to be group A's representative?"
Results
Evaluations of the three targets were submitted to a Negotiation goal × Potential representative ANOVA with the latter variable as a within-subject factor. The analysis revealed main effects of potential representative, F(2,56) = 63.24, p b 001, η² = .66, and of negotiation goal, F(2,56) = 5.85, p b .01, η² = .17. As predicted, these effects were qualified by a significant interaction between negotiation goal and potential representative, F(2,56) = 3.38, p b .01, η² = .11 (see Fig. 1 ).
The pattern of means in the instrumental goal condition was consistent with our hypotheses, F(2,58) = 25.32, p b .001, η² = .23. Perceived targets' suitability decreased linearly from the pro-outgroup deviant (M = 6.00, SD = .89) to the normative target (M = 4.48, SD=1.98), F(1,58) = 11.53, p b .01, η² = .17, to the pro-ingroup deviant (M = 2.00, SD = 1.18), F(1,58) = 20.17, p b .001, η² = .25. Moreover, the two deviant targets also differed from each other, F(1,58) = 34.74, p b .001, η² = .37. Thus, when primed with instrumental goals, the closer the target was to the outgroup, the higher its perceived suitability for ingroup representation.
A similar pattern emerged in the control condition, F(2,58) = 12.66, p b .01, η² = .12. Control participants preferred the pro-outgroup target (M =5.90, SD= .97) to the normative (M =4.95, SD= 1.79), F(1,58) = 6.42, p b .01, η² = .11, or pro-ingroup target (M = 2.80, SD=2.04), F (1,58) = 15.82, p b .001, η² = .21, and favoured the normative target over the pro-ingroup one, F(1,58) = 13.19, p b .001, η²=.19.
As predicted, in the identity goal condition, the perceived suitability of the normative target increased (M = 6.06, SD = 1.06) and no longer differed from that of the pro-outgroup deviant (M = 5.67, SD = .97), F b 1, whereas both these targets were preferred to the pro-ingroup deviant (M = 3.94, SD = 2.36), F(1,58) = 6.42, p b .01, η² = .11, and F(1,58) = 3.67, p = .06, η² = .06, respectively.
Looking at the data differently, the perceived suitability of the prooutgroup deviant did not differ as a function of negotiation goal (F b 1). In contrast, participants' negotiation goal influenced both the normative and the pro-ingroup targets' perceived suitability, F(2,56) = 4.58, p b .05, η² = .14, and F(2,56) = 5.09, p b .01, η² = .15, respectively. Specifically, and in line with our hypothesis, the perceived suitability of the normative and the pro-ingroup deviant increased in the identity goal condition as compared to both instrumental (both ps b .01) and control (p pro-ingroup b .07; p normative b .05) conditions.
Discussion
Experiment 1 provides encouraging evidence for the impact of negotiation goals on the perception of a group members' suitability for group representation in intergroup negotiations. First, our data showed that instrumental goals drive the preference for pro-outgroup deviant members. Second, making identity-related concerns salient increased the preference for targets who were further away from the outgroup (i.e., the normative and the pro-ingroup deviant targets). Finally, the similarity of the patterns obtained in the control and in the instrumental goal conditions suggests that, in the absence of any explicit definition of the group's objectives, people would seem to reason in instrumental terms.
Interestingly, we found no preference differences between the normative and pro-outgroup targets within the identity goal condition and on preferences for the pro-outgroup target between conditions. We can think of three possible explanations. First, the context may have been too abstract for the manifestation of identity concerns. Second, the priming procedure used to manipulate goals in Experiment 1 can be seen as somewhat unbalanced in the sense that the questions in the instrumental condition were more concrete than in the identity one. As a result, the obtained findings may be due to the activation of more systematic processing in the instrumental condition and more heuristic concerns in the identity one. We address these explanations (as they are related to experimental limitations) in Experiment 2 by using a different goal manipulation that secures symmetry between conditions and a more meaningful scenario as well as group categorization. A third explanation would of course be that identity-related negotiations may well be mixed-motive situations in which both goals operate simultaneously.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 aimed at generalizing findings of Experiment 1 concerning the preference for a representative in a context that was more meaningful, especially with respect to identity goals. We also addressed the question of the perceived typicality of targets as an additional outcome of the goal manipulation. Research suggests that individuals use their assessment of group members' typicality to serve their goals of intergroup differentiation and that they do so independently of the objective deviance of the targets (Abrams et al., 2000) . Moreover, previous studies have shown that perceived typicality of extreme outgroup members increases and perceived typicality of moderate outgroup members decreases under contexts of high intergroup division (Haslam, Oakes, McGarty, & Turner, 1995) .
Building upon this reasoning, we explore as an additional aspect in this experiment the possibility that the perception of a given target's typicality will also prove sensitive to the group members' goals in the negotiation. Because identity concerns relate to the motivation for positive intergroup distinctiveness and are therefore more likely to raise intergroup (rather than intragroup) concerns, we reasoned that, participants in the identity condition should clearly state differences in perceived typicality of potential representatives. On the contrary, in the instrumental goal condition, given that participants are motivated to approach the outgroup, they should see less of a difference between the normative and pro-outgroup targets.
In sum, Experiment 2 aimed not only at replicating effects of Experiment 1 concerning the preference for a representative but also at analyzing the possible impact of goals on typicality perceptions.
Method Participants and design
Forty-seven undergraduate psychology students (38 women), aged 18 to 26 (M = 19.83, SD = 1.69), participated in the experiment as part of a course requirement. Given the overall low preference for the pro-ingroup member in Experiment 1, Experiment 2 included only normative and pro-outgroup targets. The design consisted in a 2 (negotiation goal: instrumental vs. identity) by 2 (potential representative: normative vs. pro-outgroup) mixed design with the latter factor varying within participants.
Procedure
Upon their arrival to the laboratory, participants sat in separate cubicles and were handed the first part of a three-part questionnaire. Participants learned about a negotiation between psychology students (their ingroup) and engineering students concerning the joint organization of a ski trip. They were informed that three negotiation issues had already been negotiated and that three other issues were to be discussed during the upcoming negotiation. The goal manipulation was embedded in these instructions. Indeed, two sets of three negotiation issues were used. The instrumental set comprised the assignment of the rooms, the occupation schedule for a big party room, and the types of drinks. These issues all involve "divisible" objects and performance is assessed in terms of material profit. The identity set of goals comprised the logo of the trip, the content of the ski journal, and the advertising poster. Winning a negotiation on these three issues has little to do with maximizing profit but instead would allow groups to affirm their identity by making their image more visible. A pre-test of the six issues confirmed that, as expected, individuals spontaneously sorted them into the two expected sets. Participants in the instrumental (vs. identity) condition read that the two groups had already reached an agreement concerning the three identity (vs. instrumental) issues and that they were to focus on the three instrumental (vs. identity) ones in the future negotiation. After this goal manipulation, participants answered a series of questions assessing their perception of competition in the negotiation.
Next, participants were informed that they would have to evaluate two psychology students who comprised the committee organizing the trip. To manipulate the position of the targets, we created two profiles corresponding to a normative psychology student and a prooutgroup deviant psychology student. Participants were given two two-section questionnaires allegedly filled out by the two targets. In the first section of the questionnaire, the target had allegedly ranked 10 pre-tested traits, starting with the one that best described him/her. Traits typical of psychology students were: warm, friendly, tolerant, and flexible. Traits typical of engineering students were: organized, rational, well-reasoned, and hardworking. For the normative profile, the order of the traits was as follows: 3 typical psychology traits, 1 typical engineering trait, 1 neutral trait, 1 typical psychology trait, 3 typical engineering traits, and 1 neutral trait. The reverse order was used for the pro-outgroup deviant profile, starting with the 3 typical engineering traits and ending with the 3 typical psychology traits followed by the neutral one.
In the second section of the questionnaire, the two targets had allegedly evaluated the extent to which they found a series of (pretested) hobbies interesting. Hobbies typical of psychology students were shopping, scouts, charity, and reading. Hobbies typical of engineering students were card games, sudoku, computer games, and chess. The normative profile indicated greater interest in activities associated with psychology students than in activities associated with engineering and the reverse evaluation was used for the pro-outgroup deviant profile.
A pre-test confirmed that the normative profile was perceived as more typical of psychology students (M = 5.48, SD = 1.01) than of engineering students (M = 2.70, SD = 1.07), F(1,28) = 18.43, p b .001, η 2 = .40. The reverse pattern emerged for the pro-outgroup deviant profile, i.e., the profile was perceived as more typical of engineering (M = 5.80, SD = 0.79) than of psychology students (M = 3.18, SD = 1.29), F(1,28) = 16.83, p b .001, η 2 = .38.
In order to make sure that participants would pay attention to the information given, they were asked to write down their impression of the two targets in a few lines. Following this task, participants evaluated how typical of psychology students each target was. They were then informed that they would have to choose one of these two targets to be the ingroup's representative.
Dependent variables
Perception of competition. Participants were asked to convey, on a series of scales ranging from 1 (= not at all) to 9 (= totally), the extent to which they thought that the negotiation was likely to be cooperative, friendly, honest, open, respectful, competitive (reversed), and hostile (reversed) (α = .86). No difference emerged between conditions (t b 1). This variable will not be examined further.
Target's typicality. On a series of 9-point scales, participants indicated the extent to which each target was representative of psychology students, typical of psychology students, displayed characteristics that are typical of psychology students, and had a lot in common with psychology students (α = .89 and α = .94, for the normative target and pro-outgroup target, respectively).
Choice of representative. Participants reported the extent to which they would choose each target as a representative for the intergroup negotiation on a scale ranging from 1 (= not at all) to 9 (= very much).
Results
Our main dependent measure, i.e. choice of representative, was submitted to a Negotiation goal× Potential representative mixed-model ANOVA with the latter factor as a within-subject factor. There was a main effect of potential representative, F(1,45) = 4.54, p b .05, η 2 =.09, that was qualified by the predicted two-way interaction, F(1,45) = 5.53, p b .05, η 2 = .11 (see Fig. 2 ). Consistent with Experiment 1, participants in the instrumental goal condition evaluated the pro-outgroup target (M =6.96, SD= 1.34) as more suitable for ingroup representation than the normative one (M = 5.12, SD = 1.86), F(1,46) = 10.96, p b .01, η 2 = .19. In contrast, participants in the identity goal condition did not distinguish between the two targets (F b 1). Looking at the data differently, participants in the instrumental goal condition tended to prefer the normative target (M =5.12, SD= 1.86) less than participants in the identity goal condition (M =6.14, SD=1.93), F(1,46) = 3.37, p =.07, η 2 = .07. The reverse pattern emerged for the pro-outgroup target: participants in the instrumental goal condition tended to prefer the pro-outgroup target (M =6.96, SD= 1.34) more than participants in the identity goal condition (M = 6.05, SD = 1.91), F(1,46) = 3.67, p =.06, η 2 =.08.
The perceived typicality index was also submitted to a Negotiation goal × Potential representative mixed ANOVA. Again, the effect of potential representative was significant, 
Discussion
The present findings replicate those of Experiment 1 in the context of a more concrete scenario and using different goal and target manipulations. As predicted, participants with instrumental motivations preferred pro-outgroup over normative group members. No difference between targets was observed in the identity goal condition. Whereas participants with identity goals tended to prefer the normative target more than participants with instrumental goals, this pattern reversed for the pro-outgroup target. Thus, consistent with our main hypothesis, instrumental goals motivated people to select a representative who was closer to the outgroup. In contrast, when identity goals were made salient, group members who were further away from the outgroup increased in attractiveness.
Second, consistent with the idea that assessment of typicality is used strategically by people to serve their ingroup goals, our data show that typicality of the pro-outgroup target increased in the instrumental goal condition so that it no longer differed from that of the normative target. This pattern contrasts with what was found in the pre-test and observed in the identity goal condition.
General discussion
In two experiments, we showed that different goals in intergroup negotiations lead to the choice of different representatives. When the distribution of resources is at stake, pro-outgroup deviance appears as a possible means to an end for the group. These results nicely complement a series of recent findings (Hamlin & Jennings, 2007; Morton et al., 2007) and point to group members' inclination to accept pro-outgroup deviance in negotiations involving material profits. The picture changes when the identity of the group is the priority. When identity goals illuminate the negotiation context, group members are more readily attracted by representatives who are further away from the outgroup (i.e., normative and pro-ingroup deviant group members). It should be noted that our participants never reported preferring normative group members over pro-outgroup deviant ones. Rather, when the identity of the group was the prime concern, participants evaluated both types of group members as equally suitable to represent the group.
One possible explanation for this lack of differentiation between the normative and the pro-outgroup targets in negotiation contexts involving identity concerns is that, in these situations, individuals often have to strike a balance between two somewhat opposing motivations. On the one hand, the negotiation setting implies influencing another party to get the best possible outcome for one's group. On the other, the identity side of the coin implies the protection of the group's identity by a mechanism of positive distinctiveness from the other party. These two features of identity-related negotiations entail, at the same time, approach and avoidance of the outgroup. As mentioned in the introduction, there are situations in which identity concerns are tantamount to the negotiation, as it is the case in so-called "intractable" conflicts. These are conflicts that become central for the life of group members and which individuals typically deal with by relying on mechanisms of differentiation. Such situations involve "a comparison of both sides of the dilemma, resulting in a polarized decision that, ultimately, one side is right and the other is wrong" 1 For exploratory reasons we included an ingroup identification scale at the end of the questionnaire (α = .87) as this variable could possibly have moderated our effects (Morton et al., 2007) . Surprisingly, we found higher levels of identification in the instrumental goal condition (M = 6.99, SD = 1.25) than in the identity one (M = 6.15, SD = 1.45), F(1,46) = 4.52, p b .05, η 2 = .09. This finding prevented us from computing moderation analyses on our main dependent measure. Future research is needed to determine whether this pattern replicates and, if so, what may account for it, as well as to investigate the potential moderating role of this variable by having it as a premanipulation measure. (Coleman, 2003, p. 18) . The ultimate concern of group members then is not to influence the other party but to defend their positive and distinctive identity. As a consequence, normative or even pro-ingroup deviant group members should be preferred over pro-outgroup deviants as representatives. Evidence from the literature on face-saving dilemma in interpersonal negotiations provides support for this hypothesis. For instance, Brown (1968) showed that publicly humiliated individuals chose negotiation strategies that restored their selfimage even when restoration came at great financial cost for them. In any event, the interplay between the two types of goals seems to be complex. Indeed, both goals are closely interrelated in a great number of intergroup negotiations. Second, the overall absence of normative preferences in our experiments points to the importance of distinguishing the selection of representatives in intergroup negotiations from the selection of a group leader in the absence of intergroup interactions. As a matter of fact, the literature suggests that a normative leader generally represents the default choice of group members (e.g., Hogg, 2001) . Only under very specific circumstances will group members modify their default preference for the normative leader profile. What the present experiments suggest is that a preference for pro-outgroup deviance is the rule rather than the exception in the context of an intergroup negotiation.
Another question addressed in the present paper concerns the strategic use of perceived typicality as a function of group goals. Our results support a motivational approach to perceived typicality (Abrams et al., 2000; Abrams, Marques, Bown, & Dougill, 2002; Hichy, Mari, & Capozza, 2008) . Depending on the goals that group members pursue in a given situation, their perception of what a typical group member is changes. It would be interesting for future research to investigate whether people actually modify their perception of the group's identity or whether they privately acknowledge that the two targets differ in typicality but publicly report that they are the same in order minimize apparent differences with the other party.
A last remark should be made concerning the use of single-item measures of preference for representatives in both studies. This was done for several reasons. First, according to Rossiter (2002) , the use of single-item measures is justified when the construct is "concrete singular" in the mind of the raters. Second, given that we were interested in a clear behavioral intention, we actually increased the ecological validity of our experiments by directly asking for participants' preference. We thus ensured that we were measuring choice rather than some tangentially related psychological processes. Last but not least, single-item measures have been used in leadership (Kolb, Prussia, & Francoeur, 2009 ), interpersonal (e.g., IOS scale, Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992 and intergroup relations (Hodson & Costello, 2007) research as well as in work on voting behavior (Abramson, Aldrich, Paolino, & Rohde, 1995) and have shown to have levels of predictive validity that are entirely comparable to multiple-item indicators (Bergkvist & Rossiter, 2007) .
Coda
Research indicates that the selection of normative vs deviant group representatives is not without consequences for the way the negotiation ultimately unfolds. As Steinel et al. (2010 , see also, van Kleef, Steinel, van Knippenberg, Hogg, & Svensson, 2007 ) recently reported, peripheral (i.e., deviant) representatives in intergroup negotiations usually conform less to ingroup norms than their normative counterparts. In fact, peripheral members seem only to conform to ingroup norms to the extent that they are motivated to belong to the group, this way taking advantage of their role as a representative in order to improve their intragroup status. Future research should clarify what other consequences may follow the particular choice of representative that people make in a negotiation context.
